# Project #60384 - microeconomic

Game theory II

1.     Suppose that two players are bargaining over \$1. The game takes place in rounds, beginning with Round 1. The game ends when an offer is accepted. Player 1 makes offers in odd-numbered rounds and Player 2 makes offers in even-number rounds. The players can either ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ the offer. At the end of each round \$0.20 is removed from the pool of money (as punishment for not reaching agreement). If an agreement is reached in Round 2, the total pool of money is £0.80. Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium through backward induction.

2.     Which are the different coordination games you know? Create a matrix for each of these games and explain the game’s main characteristics.

3.     What is the Tit-for-tat strategy?

4.     What is the Folk Theorem?

5.   Explain the prisoner’s dilemma and provide a matrix-form representations. Outline three solutions to the prisoner’s dilemma.

 Subject General Due By (Pacific Time) 03/03/2015 12:00 pm
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